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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the controversial literature on the relationship between 
environmental policies and international trade. It provides new evidence about the 
effect of a gap in environmental policies between trading partners on trade flow on a 
sample of developed and developing countries over the 1980-2010 period. The paper 
innovates on two aspects. First, while previous studies have used partial measures of 
environmental regulations (input-oriented or output-oriented indicators), an index of a 
country’s environmental policy is computed. This index is calculated as the difference 
between observed pollution levels and “structural” pollution i.e. pollution predicted by 
determinants of environmental degradation as identified and modelled in the literature. 
This index is therefore a measure of “revealed” efforts made by countries aiming at 
downsizing environmental degradation. Second, the effect of these revealed 
environmental policies is assessed on bilateral trade flows in a gravity model. A 
particular attention is paid to similarities in environmental policies. Our results show 
that a gap in domestic efforts towards environmental protection between trading 
partners has no effect on exports. Moreover, the results do not appear to be conditional 
on the level of development of the countries trading nor on the characteristics of 
exported goods (manufactured goods and primary commodities).   
Keywords:  
Trade, Environmental policies, Gravity model 
JEL Classification: 
F14, F18, Q56 
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1 Introduction 
In the 1990s, the debate around NAFTA revived the debate on trade and the 
environment (Grossman & Krueger 1991). Antweiler et al. (2001) addressed 
theoretically the question of whether freer trade hurts the environment, and concluded 
that it did not.  This result was in the spirit of the Doha Round launched in 2001, which 
objectives comprise specific discussions on trade and the environment. This incantatory 
affirmation of win-win outcomes for trade, the environment and sustainable 
development, which has turned into the “Doha blues” (Jones 2010; Abbas 2011), is at 
odds with the prevailing idea of increasing ecological scarcities and environmental 
degradation (Barbier 2011; Rockström et al. 2009). Indeed, knowledge and the analysis 
of global environmental threats improved substantially and has steadily fuelled 
concerns about environmental degradation. For instance, the Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change (Stern 2007) highlighted the effects of climate change on 
global welfare, economic growth prospects and development. Climate change certainly 
entails a differentiated effect on developing countries (Mendelsohn  et al. 2006). It may 
threaten the ability of developing countries to target the Millennium Development Goals 
set for 2015. 
Countries have been encouraged to implement environmental policies particularly 
since the 1972 meeting of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm. Since then, environmental policies have been enforced in many developed 
countries. The US Environmental Protection Agency was created in 1970 and 
accompanied the “command and control era” during which several amendments were 
introduced to US environmental regulation (Portney 2007). In the same decade, the first 
EU Environmental Action Plan was decided, in 1973, and initiated the EU environmental 
policies which had tended to integrate within more global strategies such as the World 
Conservation Strategy advocated by the IUCN. Countries have committed themselves to 
international environmental agreements. In the wake of the Rio conference in 1992, a 
new generation of those agreements came into force and the Kyoto Protocol is the first 
example of a binding commitment to an environmental issue even though its scope 
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appeared to be limited. The debate about the effect of environmental policies, either 
domestically rooted or induced by international law on trade and growth, is still lively.  
Hallegatte et al. (2012) argue that environmental policies may contribute to economic 
growth and sustainable development. First, environmental policies that sustain and 
enhance natural capital assets (fisheries, soils and forests) on which populations rely on 
for their livelihoods, have the potential to create jobs and therefore increase incomes. 
For instance green investments may potentially increase employment in the energy 
sector i.e. wind energy, photovoltaic and biofuels sectors (Zenghelis 2011). Secondly, 
environmental policies may generate externalities. Economic activities in the tourism 
sector, which hinges upon natural assets, may increase population income and allow 
them to increase their resilience. Better air and water quality are crucial for population 
health and thus labour productivity. Thirdly, environmental policies can change the 
production frontier through innovation development and dissemination. Several 
authors believe that strong environmental policies can stimulate competition and 
exports through innovations (Porter 1991). This is the so-called Porter hypothesis 
which has been the subject of several theoretical developments within the endogenous 
growth framework (Acemoglu et al. 2012). 
On the other hand, it may be argued that environmental policies entail not only 
transaction costs (McCann et al. 2005) but potentially impede competitiveness. This is a 
consequence of the pollution haven hypothesis, according to which a firm’s localisation 
decisions are partly based on weak or poorly enforced environmental rules. Non-
stringent environmental policies and a race to the bottom supposedly create 
comparative advantages. Empirical evidence of the pollution haven hypothesis is mixed 
(Grether & Melo 2003) although recent results do not invalidate it (Kellenberg 2009; 
Levinson & Taylor 2008; Millimet & Roy 2011).  
This paper is an attempt to add to the literature on the effect of environmental 
policies on trade. The contribution is two-fold. First, we focus on the measurement of 
environmental policies which are usually labelled as either input-oriented or output-
oriented indicators. The former derive, for instance, from public research and 
development expenditure, investment expenditure in pollution abatement technologies, 
“green” taxes, or multilateral environmental agreements. The latter more simply 
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measure environmental outputs such as emission intensities, emissions per capita, or 
soil or water quality. Input oriented indicators are not always available for all countries 
however, and output oriented indicators may not solely depend on policies with 
environmental purposes. We therefore propose here to consider a modified output 
oriented index that is an index of revealed environmental policies of which methodology 
is developed in other papers. It allows an estimation of domestic efforts (Combes & 
Saadi-Sedik 2006; Combes Motel et al. 2009; Boussichas & Goujon 2010; Guillaumont  & 
Guillaumont 1988) in a manner reminiscent of the Chenery and Syrquin approach to 
identifying structural change (Chenery & Syrquin 1975). Second, contrary to most 
previous studies that analyse the effect of domestic environmental policies on trade 
(total or bilateral), the effect of a similarity in environmental policies on trade flows 
between partner countries is highlighted. Indeed, countries either rely on different 
environmental policy instruments or are engaged in different international agreements. 
This may result in different policies and results.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of 
the theoretical effects of environmental policies on bilateral trade. Section 3 presents the 
methodology to compute domestic efforts for environmental protection. Section 4 
evaluates how far environmental policies have an effect on bilateral trade flows using a 
gravity model over a sample of developing and developed countries on the 1980 2010 
period. Section 5 presents results and the last section is devoted to concluding remarks 
and implications. 
2 Relationship between environmental policies and trade 
This section reviews the way environmental policies may hamper or spur trade flows. 
2.1 Environmental policies and trade costs 
Several authors (Kellenberg 2009; Levinson & Taylor 2008; Millimet & Roy 2011) 
believe that the implementation of environmental policies may reduce the 
competitiveness of economies. Environmental policies can take several forms, such as 
command and control or market-based instruments, and can generate additional costs 
and burdens on domestic firms. If these costs are high, they may hurt the 
competitiveness of domestic firms compared to foreign ones operating under weaker 
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environmental policies. Polluting firms may relocate from countries with stringent 
environmental regulation towards countries with weaker rules. This is known as the 
pollution haven hypothesis: weak environmental regulations are a source of 
comparative advantages and modify trade patterns towards dirty goods (Liddle 2001). 
Moreover, since environmental quality is a normal good, demand for environmental 
regulations may be higher in developed countries than in developing countries. 
Theoretical models and studies suggest a negative link between environmental 
regulation costs and trade flows. Using a theoretical model where the manufacturing 
sector differs in primary factors (labour, capital) and pollution intensity, Levinson & M. 
S. Taylor (2008) show a positive relationship between pollution abatement costs and a 
country’s imports.  Peters et al. (2011) provide evidence of carbon leakage. They show 
that the implementation of environmental policies and agreements in developed 
countries has increased the imports of polluting intensive goods from developing 
countries. In addition to compliance costs (for example expenditures on control and new 
equipment monitoring), Ryan (2012) shows that environmental regulations increase 
costs and market power. For instance, sunk costs of entry of firms into U.S. markets have 
significantly increased under the Clean Air Act (CCA). Consequently incumbent firms 
have benefited from increased market power. 
Few studies (Van Beers & Van Den Bergh 1997; Cagatay & Mihci 2006; Keller & 
Levinson 2002) found a negative effect of environmental regulation on trade patterns. 
Van Beers & Van Den Bergh (1997) highlight that a divergence between the 
environmental regulations of developing and developed countries negatively impacts 
pollution-intensive goods trade (mining, non-ferrous metals, or chemical products). 
Cagatay & Mihci (2006) found that they had a negative effect on pollution intensive 
goods. Using the propensity score matching method, Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) 
analyse the effect of  Kyoto Protocol commitments  on bilateral exports. They show that 
Kyoto commitment has cut the exports of Kyoto countries by 13 - 14%. Energy intensive 
industries such as iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, and organic and inorganic 
chemicals, are highly affected.   
Moreover, according to Dean et al (2009), the attractiveness of environmental 
regulations to foreign investments in China is conditional on the investor´s source 
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country and the industry characteristics. The study concludes that investment from high 
income countries and non-polluting industries are not attracted by weak environmental 
regulations. 
Tobey (1990) and Cole & Elliott (2003) do not evidence of any relationship between 
environmental regulations and pollution intensive industries, nor net exports. Trade 
flows are explained instead by differences in factor endowments (capital, labour, natural 
resources). A similar result was found by Xu (2000). The lack of evidence in support of 
the negative effect of environmental regulations on trade may be explained with two 
reasons. For most industries, environmental costs are smaller than other costs and 
consequently the effect of environmental policies on international competitiveness are 
probably minor (Nordström and Vaughan (1999). Further, gains from trade are 
generally sufficient to pay for additional abatement expenditures and other regulatory 
costs.  Jug & Mirza (2005) consider that the effect of environmental regulations is 
related to the degree of product differentiation. They show that environmental 
stringency has less effect on the trade of differentiated goods with a low price elasticity. 
Albrecht (1998) explains the non-negative impact of environmental regulations through 
the fact that many developed countries have diversified exports and that most studies 
do not focus on specific products. 
2.2 Environmental policies and innovation 
Environmental policies may also have a positive effect on trade flows. Porter (1991) 
and Porter & Van der Linde (1995) explain that tougher environmental policies 
stimulate technological innovation, thereby increasing productivity and 
competitiveness. They dismiss the pollution haven hypothesis as a supposedly static 
perspective which therefore does not take in account the reactions and behaviours of 
firms confronted by environmental regulations. When firms face potentially high 
abatement costs, they will be incited to change production routines, invest in innovative 
activities and find new ways to achieve environmental objectives and product new 
marketable goods. They may become more aware of new methods of production that 
reduce production costs (through increased efficiency, decreased resource inputs) and 
increase the quality and competitiveness of products. This is the so-called Porter 
hypothesis, according to which environmental policies may stimulate innovation 
opportunities, and improve the productivity and competitiveness of countries. 
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Three arguments may support the Porter hypothesis. The first one is the strategic 
effect inside firms. Sinclair-Desgagne & Gabel (1997) assume that firms have myopic 
behaviours. The implementation of environmental policy can incite them to reconsider 
existing routines and improve business performance. Xepapadeas & de Zeeuw (1999) 
for instance, found that environmental regulations such as emission taxes increase a 
firm’s productivity and profits.  
The second argument relies on strategic effects between firms. Mohr (2002) 
developed a theoretical model in which productivity gains are associated with learning 
by doing. In other words, the productivity of a new green technology is a function of the 
total accumulated experience in the industry. Because no firm is forced to bear the 
burden of adopting green technologies (the initial learning costs), governments may 
promote them with stringent environmental policies.  By imposing environmental 
policies,  the government may incite domestic industries to invest in research and 
development activities (Simpson & Bradford 1996; Greaker 2003). They can acquire 
strategic advantages and improve their competitiveness in international markets 
through better access to markets, the possibility of differentiating products or selling 
pollution-control technology (Lanoie et al. 2011). Using survey data from 78 European 
firms operating in the building and construction sector, Testa et al. (2011) showed that 
environmental policies (measured by inspection frequency) have a positive effect on 
investments in advanced technological equipment, innovative products and business 
performance. Albrecht (1998) evidences that countries with relatively active 
environmental regulatory (national ozone policy) have improved their competitiveness 
of CFC- using manufacturers. Similarly Costantini & Mazzanti (2012) show that, for the 
EU15 over the period 1996–2007, the high technology sector was positively affected by 
energy and environmental taxation whereas the more energy intensive medium and low 
technology sectors were not affected. Some authors (De Santis 2012; Trotignon 2011) 
believe that the positive effect of environmental regulations on trade flows may be 
related to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) or regional trade agreements 
which allow trade creation and the diffusion of environmental-related production 
standards.   
The third argument is that the implementation of environmental policies may 
contribute to increasing environmental awareness and affect the preferences of 
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consumers. Firms are forced to produce new goods in order to survive. Realising a 
literature review on theoretical foundations and empirical studies on the Porter 
Hypothesis, Ambec et al. (2013) show that several recent studies  support it.  These 
recent results are explained by a heightened social awareness and responsibility for 
sustainable development. In a world characterised by improving environmental 
performances, firms and industries are more able to become competitive and produce 
green goods.1 
3 How to measure environmental policy? 
We review here existing indicators and propose our methodology for the 
implementation of revealed environmental policies. 
3.1  Existing indicators of environmental policies 
Input-oriented indicators are input efforts devoted to environmental protection. 
Several authors use public research and development expenditures, current investment 
expenditures in pollution abatement and control, energy tax, or the number of 
multilateral environmental agreements signed by countries, as proxies for 
environmental policies. However there are two limits to this approach: the enforcement 
of multilateral agreements and the lack of data on wide time and geographical coverage 
for some inputs.  
Van Beers & Van Den Bergh (1997) believe that output oriented indicators are better 
proxies for environmental policies. Indicators used in the economic literature include 
emissions intensities (SOx, NOx, CO2, and SO2), emissions per capita, or other pollutants 
related to water or soil quality. The main limitation of these indicators is that output 
oriented indicators may depend on environmental policies as well as on structural 
factors. For instance, several determinants of pollution may be out of a government’s 
hands. These are related to long term economic development, business cycles, 
demographic dynamics or international prices.  
                                                        
1 This effect is somehow in the same vein as the “pollution halo” hypothesis according to which better 
technologies and management, green preferences of consumers in developed countries raise environment 
friendly technology transfers and know-how. See Zarsky (1999) for a review.  
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We thus want to disentangle those structural factors from policies and measures 
dedicated to achieving better environmental quality. From our point of view, comparing 
observed to “structural” environmental degradation may deliver a proper measure of 
environmental policies.  
3.2 An indicator of revealed environmental policies 
This approach has been used by other authors. Combes & Saadi-Sedik (2006) built an 
indicator of a trade policy’s openness or revealed trade policy whereas Combes Motel et 
al. (2009) estimate an indicator of policies against deforestation. Structural 
environmental degradation is obtained by calculating the level of pollution a country 
should have as a result of its structural characteristics. The indicator of revealed 
environmental policy is the difference between observed pollution levels and structural 
pollution. It captures revealed environmental policies, based on their results. The main 
interest in this approach is that it provides a standardised measure of the environmental 
efforts of countries; it also avoids subjectivity in the choice and weighting in the 
combination of several environmental policy instruments. Another interest is that the 
measure of structural environmental degradation may be based on economic theory 
explaining environmental degradation.  
More formally, let us assume that environmental degradation , of country i at 
period t depend on a vector ,	 of structural factors: 
, =		,	 + ,	      (2) 
The error term ,	 provides the measure of revealed environmental policies: 
,	 = , −		,	      (3) 
Environmental policies are said to be efficient when the observed environmental 
degradation is lower that the predicted structural level i.e. when ,	 is significantly 
negative. This indicates that environmental policies are successful in the mitigation of 
environmental degradation. On the other hand, environmental policies fail when ,	 is 
significantly positive. This may be the outcome of policy as well as market failures. It is 
worth noting that since ,	is the error term; its average value is zero: this indicator is 
relative.  
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3.2.1 How to identify structural and mixed determinants of environmental degradation  
A measure of revealed environmental policies requires identification of the structural 
factors of environmental degradation. Table 1 classifies those structural factors: income 
per capita, population growth, economic growth and lagged level of emissions. Other 
factors of environmental degradation may be related to specific policies. These policies 
are of two sorts. First, environmental mitigation can be the result of domestic initiatives. 
For instance, environmental commitments, as defined by international environmental 
agreements, contribute to domestic environmental efforts. Secondly, environmental 
degradation is also influenced by other policies such as education policies, industrial 
policies or policies targeting more efficient institutions. The classification of other 
factors between structural determinants, domestic efforts of environmental protection 
and other policies may be questionable. These factors are trade openness, the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) and income inequality. Table 1 below summarises our 
characterisation of the determinants of environmental degradation.  
Table 1: Classification of main variables related to environmental degradation 
Structural factors Domestic Efforts for  Environmental preservation Mixed variables for 
structural factors and 
domestic efforts for 
environmental protection 
 
Policies for 
environmental 
preservation 
 
Policies for various 
objectives 
Income per capita  
Economic growth 
Lagged emissions 
per capita 
Population growth  
International 
environmental 
agreements  
National environmental 
policies 
Political institutions 
Education Policies 
Trade openness 
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate 
Income inequality 
3.2.1.1 Income per capita 
The relationship between income per capita and environmental quality has been 
widely studied in literature. According to several authors, environmental quality first 
deteriorates and then improves as income per capita increases (Grossman & Krueger 
1995; Antweiler, Copeland, & Taylor 2001). In other words, environmental quality may 
be considered a luxury good in the first stage of development. Poor people are more 
concerned with food and other essential needs and less concerned with environmental 
protection. At higher income levels, people want higher levels of environmental quality. 
Moreover, higher incomes enable higher public expenditure on environmental 
infrastructures, as well as environmental policies that drive private sector expenditure 
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towards abatement technologies. Income per capital is a structural factor of 
environmental quality: it is often considered in the literature as an “underlying” factor 
that characterises overall economic conditions. Moreover, a nonlinear effect of income 
per capita can also be tested in accordance with the Environmental Kuznets Curve. 
3.2.1.2 Economic growth 
It is assumed that the economic climate or economic growth may have an ambiguous 
effect on environmental degradation for two reasons: a positive effect may be explained 
by structural change in the economy, from the industrialised sectors to the 
manufacturing and service sectors. A negative effect on environmental quality may be 
explained by a change of economic structure from agricultural to industrialised sectors. 
Moreover, when economic growth slows, countries are not incited to implement 
environmental policies.  
3.2.1.3 Population growth 
It is generally assumed that population pressure is a driver of environmental 
degradation. This idea is popularised by the well-known IPAT identity (Ehrlich & 
Holdren 1971). Access to food or to energy involves, for instance, emissions of 
greenhouse gases. Holdren (1991) shows the contribution of population growth to 
greenhouse gas emissions as being responsible for 40% (36%) of the increase in energy 
consumption (annual emissions growth) respectively. Shi (2003) finds that the effect of 
population growth on pollution is higher in developing countries than in developed 
countries. 
3.2.1.4 Lagged level of emissions per capita 
This variable may be a determinant of current levels of air pollution. The latter may 
be justified by inertia in environmental degradation. It may be also the result of 
convergence in environmental degradation, i.e. emissions, as theoretically established by 
Brock & Taylor (2010) and tested by Kinda (2010). Lagged emissions, as justified by the 
convergence hypothesis, belong to the set of structural determinants of current 
environmental degradation.  
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3.2.1.5 Trade openness 
Grossman & Krueger (1995) decompose the effects of trade on environmental quality 
into scale, technical and composition effects. The scale effect of trade measures the 
negative environmental consequences of scalar increases in economic activity. The 
technical effect is the positive environmental consequence of increases in income, which 
call for cleaner production methods. The composition effect can have a positive or 
negative impact on the environment because it measures the evolution of the economy 
towards a more or less appropriate productive structure. Thus, Antweiler et al. (2001) 
conclude that trade reduced the  pollution emissions of 43 countries over the period 
1971-1996. According to Frankel & Rose (2005), trade is favourable to the reduction of 
pollution. However, other authors such as Magnani (2000) highlights a negative impact 
of trade on carbon dioxide emissions. 
Discussing the effect of trade openness on the environment illustrates how difficult it 
is to establish a clear-cut delimitation between structural determinants and domestic 
policies. Indeed Combes Motel et al. (2009) and Combes & Guillaumont (2002) 
disentangle the natural openness that is explained by structural factors (size of 
countries, geographical characteristics) from outward-looking policies implemented by 
governments which have cut tariffs or withdrawn restrictions or quotas. In Table 1, 
policies favouring trade openness are considered as a mixed variable: they may partly 
channel the influence of structural factors on environmental degradation. 
3.2.1.6 Income inequality 
The effect of income inequality on environmental quality has been analysed by many 
scholars. Magnani (2000) and  Koop  & Tole  (2001) found that  inequality of income 
tends to exacerbate pollution and deforestation respectively. Political economy models 
provide theoretical arguments according to which income inequality increases 
environment degradation through the rate of time preference (Boyce 1994). Indeed, 
income inequality reduces awareness of environmental quality for both rich and poor:  
the poor would overexploit natural and environmental resources to ensure survival. 
Moreover, income inequality and a polarization of resources increase and exacerbate 
conflicts (violence, social troubles). Rich people seem to prefer a policy of overexploiting 
the environment and natural resources and investing the returns abroad. Torras & 
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Boyce (1998) assume that political power is highly correlated with income inequality: in 
unequal societies, those who benefit from environmental degradation (the rich) are 
more powerful than those who bear the costs (the poor). Therefore, the cost-benefit 
analysis predicts environmental degradation as a result of income inequality. Borghesi 
(2006) argues that the implementation of environmental policies is more likely with 
social consensus. It is easier to get this consensus in an equal society that in an unequal 
society with conflicts between political agents and social instability.  
However other scholars believe that income inequality may have no effect or 
improved environmental quality. Ravallion et al. (2000) claim that the impact of income 
inequality on environmental degradation depends on the marginal propensity to emit 
(MPE). If the poor have a higher (lower) MPE than the rich, a reduction of income 
inequality will increase (reduce) pollution emissions respectively. One cannot predict a 
priori which of these two effects will happen. Indeed, the poor may consume goods with 
more (or less) pollution than the rich. Therefore the effect of income inequality is not 
clear and depends on whether the MPE increases or decreases as income grows. In other 
words it depends on the second derivative of the pollution-income function.  
Similarly to trade openness, we may suppose that inequality of income may be 
explained simultaneously by structural factors and by policies (social and economic). 
Indeed, Milanovic (2010) shows that income inequality is determined by income per 
capita, the ideology (religion), and the quality of democratic institutions that favour 
redistribution policies.  
3.2.1.7 Real effective exchange rate (REER) 
The real effective exchange rate may affect environmental degradation. Arcand et al. 
(2008) show that real exchange rate depreciation may reduce environmental protection 
in developing countries, and has the opposite effect in developed countries. The REER 
depends on international prices, which are structural factors, but also on economic 
policies. The REER is therefore a mixed variable according to the typology of Table 1. 
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3.2.2 How to measure domestic efforts towards environmental protection? 
3.2.2.1 Econometric model and results 
The measurement of domestic efforts towards environmental protection is made on a 
panel of 128 countries over 1980 to 2010. Data are compiled in five-year averages. The 
panel data regression takes the following form: 
, =	 + 	,	 +  + ,   (4) 
, is the measure of environmental degradation. Two indicators2 are used: carbon 
dioxide per capita (CO2) emissions and sulphur dioxide per capita (SO2). Country fixed 
effects  are taken into account and control for time invariant structural determinants. 
Period fixed effects  allow controlling for omitted variables that are common to the 
countries (e.g. international prices). As explained in section 3.2, the residual of this 
regression is labelled domestic effort for environmental protection (DEEP).  
Equation (4) may be estimated with different econometric methods (ordinary least 
squared (OLS), fixed effects (FE), and random effects (RE)). However these methods are 
inadequate because the former (OLS) does not take unobserved heterogeneity of 
countries into account and the latter (FE, RE) are inadequate for dynamic models. 
Because our model is a dynamic panel, we use the GMM-System (Generalized Method of 
Moment) from Arellano & Bond (1991), Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond 
(1998).  
The GMM-System (Generalized Method of Moment) is a method that estimates a 
system of two equations: one equation in level and the other in first differences.  In the 
first estimate, we use lagged variables in levels of at least one period as instruments of 
the equation in first differences. It removes unobserved time invariant and unobserved 
individual characteristics. The conditions to be met are that the error terms are 
                                                        
2 In the absence of a single measure of environmental quality, many indicators have been used in the 
literature as a proxy for environmental quality. The choice of () as an environmental indicator is based 
on two reasons. First, data on carbon dioxide emissions is available for longer time-series than any other 
pollution indicator. Secondly, at the global level, () is an immediate cause of greenhouse gas, 
responsible for global warming and climate change. The choice of () as another environmental 
variable is also based on two arguments. Contrary to carbon dioxide emissions, sulfure dioxide is a local 
pollutant. It is widely regarded as one of the most prominent forms of air pollution worldwide, since it has 
direct and visible effects on human health, ecosystems, and the economy (Konisky 1999). Secondly, data 
for () emissions is more reliable than data for other forms of air pollution (so-called criteria 
pollutants), and it is also available for a large number of countries since the 1970s. 
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uncorrelated and that explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. In the second 
estimate, we use variables in first differences lagged of at least one period as 
instruments of the equation in levels.  
To check the validity of results we use the standard Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions (where the null hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are not 
correlated with the residual)  and the serial correlation test (AR(2), where the null 
hypothesis is that the errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation). 
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 2 show that the coefficients of most structural variables 
have the expected signs. The coefficient associated with lagged emissions (carbon 
dioxide and sulphur dioxide) per capita concludes a divergence on emission per capita 
for 122 countries. This is not a surprising result: convergence is corroborated only in 
developed countries (Criado  et al. 2011). Income per capita, economic and population 
growth and trade have an effect on environmental degradation. We find that an increase 
of (REER)3  reduces environmental degradation (the coefficient associated with REER is 
significant for sulphur dioxide per capita). Indeed, an appreciation of the exporting 
country’s currency against its main trading partners may reduce exports and pollution. 
In columns (2) and (5) we control for income inequality. Results show that income 
inequality reduces environmental degradation. When we check for the existence of an 
Environmental Kuznets Curve by including the squared income per capita (columns (3) 
and (6) of table 2), this hypothesis is rejected for carbon dioxide emissions. 
3.2.2.2 Discussion on Domestic Efforts of Environmental Protection 
To compute the indicator of environmental policy, we use columns (1) of Table 2. 
Indeed, when we include income inequality (columns 2 & 3), we lose observations.  For 
robustness checks in the analysis of the relationship between environmental policies 
and bilateral trade, we use columns (2) and (3). 
Tables 3 and 4 provide a synthesis of the domestic efforts towards environmental 
protection (DEEP) of different groups of countries over the periods 1980-1989, 1990-
                                                        
3 The real exchange effective rate (REER) is computed by taking into account oil exporters in the 
calculation of the weighting of the main trade partners. When we use the REER without oil exporters ant 
the volatility of real exchange effective rate, we find similar results.   
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1999 and 2000-2010. We may distinguish three groups. The first groups (Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and South Asia (SA)) are countries in which domestic 
efforts towards environmental regulation are weak.  These domestic efforts do not 
compensate for structural environmental degradation (carbon dioxide emissions) over 
the three decades (1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2010). Similar results are found for 
the second group (Middle East & North Africa (MENA)) even if these domestic policies 
have no effect on environmental degradation during the period 2000-2009 and 1990-
1999 respectively. The third group (North America (NA), Western Europe (WE)) are 
countries which have domestic policies that appear to be successful in reducing 
environmental degradation.  
Annex 1 shows that the two indicators (domestic efforts of environmental protection) 
are correlated to multilateral environmental agreements (such as Annex 1 of Kyoto 
Protocol) and some environmental measures such as energy taxes (Energy tax revenues 
as a percentage of total revenues) and environmental tax ratios. 
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Table 2: Estimation Results (Carbon dioxide emissions and Sulphur dioxide emissions) 
Dependent variables Log of  carbon dioxide  per capita Log of  sulphur dioxide  per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged carbon dioxide 0.656*** 0.894*** 0.593***    
per capita (log) (4.930) (8.955) (5.070)    
Lagged sulphur dioxide    0.970*** 1.043*** 0.754*** 
per capita (log)    (6.907) (8.770) (4.839) 
Income capita (log) 0.404*** 0.208*** 1.649** 0.241*** 0.173*** 2.920*** 
 (3.167) (3.135) (2.474) (3.080) (3.613) (2.749) 
Population growth 0.0456* -0.00713 -0.00961 -0.00581 0.0758 0.250** 
 (1.692) (-0.170) (-0.182) (-0.0801) (0.833) (2.091) 
Economic growth 0.0174*** 0.0362*** 0.0187*** 0.0145** 0.0371** 0.00540** 
 (3.041) (4.593) (3.721) (2.054) (2.605) (2.045) 
Trade (log) 0.0921** 0.0708*** 0.0860** -0.599* -0.588 -0.0532 
 (2.006) (2.934) (2.283) (-1.731) (-1.423) (-0.154) 
REER -0.145   -0.501**   
 (-1.573)   (-2.059)   
Income inequality  -0.0456* -0.0160**  -0.0174*** -0.0168* 
  (-1.692) (-2.028)  (-3.041) (-1.704) 
Income cap sq (log)   0.0128   -0.178*** 
   (0.239)   (-2.787) 
Intercept -1.395* -1.503** -6.592** 4.145** 4.132** -13.34** 
 (-1.798) (-2.350) (-2.413) (2.118) (2.179) (-2.316) 
       
Observations 689 486 486 554 389 389 
Countries 128 111 111 124 107 107 
AR(1) 0.004 0.016 0.01 0.058 0.062 0.001 
AR(2) 0.396 0.364 0.443 0.128 0.568 0.384 
Hansen Test 0.269 0.432 0.163 0.166 0.176 0.176 
Instruments 25 24 25 24 21 22 
Notes: * significantly at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1980-2010 and 1980-2004 for carbon dioxide emissions and  
sulphur dioxide emissions respectively. For robustness checks we include other variables (the density of population, natural resources, oil  
and minerals rents). They do not have an effect on environmental degradation. 
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Table 3: Index of Domestic Efforts for environmental protection: CO2 emissions 
Regions 1980- 89 1990- 99 2000- 10 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  (ECA) +*  +*** 
Middle East & North Africa (MENA) +*   
South Asia (SA) +**** +**** +**** 
Western Europe (WE) -**** -**** -**** 
North America (NA) -**** -**** -**** 
Sub Saharan Africa (SSA)    
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) -*   
The signs are reported here when they are statistically different from zero at the 1% (****), 5%  
(***), 10%level (**), and 25% (*) levels. Negative signs are for successful environmental policies 
 
Table 4: Domestic Efforts for environmental protection: SO2 emissions 
Regions 1980-89 1990-99 2000-04 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  (ECA) +* -****  
Middle East & North Africa (MENA) +****   
South Asia (SA)  -* -**** 
Western, Europe (WE) -* -**** -* 
North America (NA) -* -****  
Sub Saharan Africa (SS)  -**** -* 
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) -***   
The signs are reported here when they are statistically different from zero at the 1% (****),  
5% (***), 10% (**), 25% (*) levels 
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Figure 1: Domestic efforts for environmental protection (C02) for the period 1980-2010 
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Figure 2: Domestic efforts for environmental protection (s02) for the period 1980-2010 
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4 Empirical analysis: effect of revealed environmental policies on 
bilateral trade 
The objective of the paper is to analyse the effect of gaps in environmental policies 
between trading partners on bilateral trade flows for the period 1980-2010. For this 
purpose, we present the econometric model and the empirical method. Moreover, we 
describe the determinants of bilateral trade flows and the database source. 
4.1 Empirical Model 
4.1.1 Econometric model 
In line with previous papers, we use an augmented gravity model of international 
trade. The gravity model relates bilateral trade flows (exports) between country i and 
country j at time t to its determinants (such as the economic sizes, trade costs, 
environmental policies). The equation can be written as: 
ln,,		 =  +  +	, +  +	 + 	,, + 	 + ε,,   (5) 
With  the matrix of control variables, ,,  is the gap in environmental policies 
between trading partners (i, j) at period t. The gap in environmental policies is the 
absolute difference of domestic efforts for environmental protection (DEEP) of the 
exporting and importing countries. The data cover the period from 1980 to 2010 and are 
compiled in five-year averages (1980-1984, 1985-1989…). ,,	 is the export flow from 
country (i) to country (j) at period (t). 
Control variables () are the main determinants of bilateral trade flows. They are the 
distance between country i and country j, the existence of a common border (the 
variable is equal to one if i and j share a common border), the language (an index of 
language similarity between countries i and j)4; the economic and population size of 
partner countries, and the real exchange effective rate of countries. These are from the 
economic literature.  Finally ε,,  is the error term. The model also includes a complete 
set of specific effects:  
                                                        
4 The fixed effect estimates with country-pair takes bilateral distance, colonial linkages, common border 
into account. 
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: common effect to all periods and pairs of countries (constant) 
: specific effect to periods t but common to all the pairs of countries to take into 
account common shocks . ,  
,: specific effect to each pair of countries and common to all the periods.  
: exporter specific effect and	 and importer specific effect 
4.1.2 Estimation strategy   
The effect of domestic environmental policies on bilateral trade is tested with a panel 
gravity model framework.  Equation (1) can be estimated with three basic approaches: 
ordinary least square (OLS), fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE).  
The main disadvantage of using OLS estimates is that they do not take into account 
any unobserved heterogeneity of countries which simultaneously affects the 
environmental policies and the volume of trade. Indeed, Anderson & van Wincoop 
(2003) highlighted the existence of multilateral resistance among trading partners. The 
OLS estimates may be biased if the equation does not specifically take the unobserved 
heterogeneity of countries into account. To control for multilateral resistance among 
trading partners, we follow previous studies (Yu 2010; Carrère 2006) and include 
country-pair specific effects. They control for bilateral distance, colonial linkages, 
common borders, or any other geographical or time-invariant institutional 
characteristics. They may be determinants of bilateral flows as evidenced in previous 
empirical studies (Carrère 2006; Baier & Bergstrand 2007; Baier & Bergstrand 2009). 
The Hausman test allows a choice of fixed effects (FE) versus random effects (RE). 
4.2 Data sources and description of variables 
Bilateral exports flows are from the UN Comtrade database for the period 1980-2010. 
The dataset has 72 export and 128 import countries.  Income (GDP) and the population 
of each home and host country are drawn from the World Development Indicators 
(2012). The data on distance, contiguity and cultural proximity (common language) are 
from the CEPII distance database. The data on real effective exchange rate (REER)5 are 
from CERDI. The index of environmental policy is the residual of regression in which 
environmental quality (carbon dioxide per capita) is explained by structural and mixed 
factors (see Table 1). We compute our index, labelled domestic effort for environmental 
                                                        
5 An increase means an appreciation and thus a deterioration of competitiveness. 
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protection (DEEP), by normalizing the residual of regression. We obtain a score ranging 
from -10 (stringent DEEP) to 10 (laxist DEEP). 
Appendix 2 presents the definition and source of variables whereas descriptive 
statistics and correlation of variables are summarized in Appendix 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
5 Results 
5.1 Basic results 
Table 5 gives the results of the effects of gaps in revealed environmental policies 
(domestic effort for environmental protection) between partner countries on trade 
flows, using different econometric methods. Column (1) presents the results with an OLS 
estimator. It allows traditional determinants of trade flows such as common language, 
distance, common language and contiguity to be taken into account. It does not, 
however, take the unobserved heterogeneity of countries into account. We thus run 
fixed effects (column 2) and random effects (column 3) estimators.  
Most determinants are significant and consistent with expectations. The higher the 
income of both exporting and importing countries, the larger the trade flow. In other 
words, income captures the increasing capacity of partner countries to trade. Trade 
flows reduce with the population size of partner countries because bigger countries have 
relatively lower costs when trading domestically than do smaller ones, and may benefit from 
increasing returns. 
The increase of distance between partner countries has a negative effect on trade 
flow whereas countries that share a common border and common language trade more. 
Indeed a common border and language may reduce transaction costs and facilitate trade 
negotiations. An appreciation of real effective exchange rate increases trade flows. This 
result does not conform to economic theory. Indeed, an increase of REER reflects an 
appreciation of the exporting country’s currency against its main trading partners, 
which reduce exports. 
Whatever the method used, results show that a gap in environmental policies has no 
effect on bilateral trade flows. Indeed the coefficient associated with a gap in 
environmental policies is not significant. It suggests neither pollution havens nor evidence 
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for the Porter hypothesis, which would be reflected, respectively, in significant positive 
and negative coefficients for environmental policies. Two arguments may partially 
explain our results. First, we may assume that the costs of domestic environmental 
policies are low compared to other factors (economic size, endowments, technology, 
transports, etc). Secondly, we may consider that the potential effect of environmental 
policies may depend on the nature or the type or characteristic of the goods. Indeed 
more stringent environmental regulation may only have an effect on specific goods, such 
as energy intensive goods. 
Table 5: Effect of similarity in environmental policy on bilateral trade flows 
 Log of exports 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS FE RE 
Log GDP (i) 1.315*** 1.550*** 1.401*** 
 (155.1) (28.21) (104.4) 
Log GDP (j) 1.089*** 1.218*** 1.105*** 
 (154.4) (25.34) (83.93) 
Log Population (i) -0.157*** -1.568*** -0.226*** 
 (-13.62) (-14.79) (-11.85) 
Log Population (j) -0.124*** 0.894*** -0.0990*** 
 (-12.69) (9.020) (-5.467) 
Log  reer (i) 0.0314 0.0461** 0.117*** 
 (1.232) (2.322) (6.443) 
Gap ER(i,j) 0.0108** 0.00298 0.00359 
 (2.223) (0.472) (0.646) 
Common Language 0.771***  0.837*** 
 (24.26)  (13.77) 
Log distance -0.000212***  -0.000219*** 
 (-76.82)  (-42.65) 
contiguity 2.219***  2.243*** 
 (29.32)  (15.89) 
Intercept -50.94*** -54.68*** -53.28*** 
 (-191.1) (-19.69) (-135.4) 
Observations 37,787 38,216 37,787 
R-squared 0.782 0.813  
Bilateral countries  8,689 8,332 
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. T statistics in parentheses 
 
5.2 Heterogeneity in the levels of economic development and characteristics of 
goods 
In this section, we identify potential heterogeneities in the relationship between gaps 
in environmental policies and bilateral trade flows. First, we evaluate whether the effect 
of a gap in environmental policies on trade flows is conditional on the level of 
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development of countries. Second, we focus our attention on the effect of environmental 
policies on the characteristics of exported goods. 
5.2.1 Does economic development matter? 
Given that the incomes of trading partners may vary, is the effect of differences in 
environmental policies on trade flows sensitive to their level of economic development? 
Indeed we may assume that the marginal effect of a gap in environmental policies could 
be stronger in some countries than in others. When the level of economic development 
of trading partners increases, they may be incited to increase domestic efforts towards 
environmental protection. We test this hypothesis by adding in our estimations the level 
of economic development of trading partners (GDP, column 2, table 6), the difference in 
economic development of trading partners (column 3, table 6) and their interactive term 
(gap in environmental policies*GDP of trading partners, gap in environmental 
policies*difference in GDP of trading partners). Results show that the impact of a gap in 
environmental policies on trade flows is not conditional on the level or difference in 
economic development of trading partners. 
5.2.2 Do the characteristics of products have an effect? 
By increasing the costs of firms through abatement policies or environmental tax, 
environmental policies may increase prices and reduce the competitiveness of goods. 
However the sensitivity of consumers to price variation depends on the nature of goods. 
They may be more sensitive to differentiated goods than homogeneous goods. To take 
into account the characteristics of goods, we distinguish manufactured goods (column 3 
of table 7) and primary common goods (column 2 of table 7). We find that the marginal 
impact of a gap in environmental policies does not depend on the characteristics of 
goods. In other words, it does not favour (or dampen) the export of manufactured and 
primary commodity products. 
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Table 6: Effect of similarity in environmental policy on bilateral trade flows: the 
importance of economic development 
Dependent variable Log of exports 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP (i) 1.550*** 1.555*** 1.549*** 
 (28.21) (28.11) (28.05) 
Log GDP (j) 1.218*** 1.222*** 1.217*** 
 (25.34) (25.28) (25.23) 
Log Population (i) -1.568*** -1.575*** -1.567*** 
 (-14.79) (-14.81) (-14.76) 
Log Population (j) 0.894*** 0.890*** 0.895*** 
 (9.020) (8.975) (9.022) 
Log reer (i) 0.0461** 0.0453** 0.0463** 
 (2.322) (2.280) (2.329) 
Gap ER(i,j) 0.00298 0.0792 -0.0118 
 (0.472) (0.871) (-0.165) 
Gap ER(i,j)*Log GDP  -0.00306  
per capita (i,j)  (-0.840)  
Gap ER(i,j)*Difference in log GDP    0.000587 
per capita (i,j)   (0.207) 
Intercept -54.68*** -54.75*** -54.67*** 
 (-19.69) (-19.71) (-19.68) 
    
Observations 38,216 38,216 38,216 
R-squared 0.813 0.813 0.813 
Joint signif Gap ER(i,j) coeff (p-value)  0.4007 0.8754 
Bilateral countries 8,689 8,689 8,689 
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. T-statistics in parentheses. 
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    Table 7: Environmental policies and trade flows: characteristics of  
goods (manufactured and primary commodity) 
Dependent variable Exports (log) Primary 
commodity 
exports (log) 
Manufactured 
exports (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP (i) 1.550*** 0.748** 2.001*** 
 (28.21) (2.569) (6.323) 
Log GDP (j) 1.218*** 0.986*** 1.044*** 
 (25.34) (7.327) (6.534) 
Log Population (i) -1.568*** -1.802*** 0.821 
 (-14.79) (-2.610) (1.480) 
Log Population (j) 0.894*** -0.925*** -0.759** 
 (9.020) (-3.660) (-2.374) 
Log reer (i) 0.0461** -0.455 0.370 
 (2.322) (-1.193) (1.282) 
Gap ER(i,j) 0.00298 0.00658 0.00137 
 (0.472) (0.323) (0.0576) 
Intercept -54.68*** 11.16 -69.45*** 
 (-19.69) (0.883) (-5.966) 
Observations 38,216 1,777 3,046 
R-squared 0.813 0.307 0.188 
Bilateral countries 8,689 465 897 
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. T statistics in parentheses 
5.3 Robustness Checks  
Previous sections show that a similarity in environmental policies between trading 
partners has no effect on their trade flows. We verify the robustness of previous results 
in several ways. First, we include more control variables to check the pertinence of 
results. Second, we apply an alternative econometric approach, the Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation to address the zero trade problem. Third, we 
use other measures of bilateral trade and environmental policies.  
5.3.1 Adding control variables 
Previous results have shown that the similarity in environmental policies between 
trading countries has no effect on bilateral trade flows. However environmental policy 
could be a reflection of the quality of institutions. In other words, the stricter a country’s 
environmental policy, the better institutions it will have. Indeed some authors (Méon & 
Sekkat 2008; Yu 2010) suggest that institutions could promote trade flows, particularly 
for manufactured goods. This may explain the non-significance of the interest variable. 
In order to capture the effect of environmental policies only, we control for institutional 
quality and include the level of corruption, the quality of law and order and democracy 
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in trading partners. The results are not affected (Table 8) when controlling either by 
corruption, order and law and democracy. 
Table 8: Effect of similarity in environmental policy on bilateral trade flows: more 
control variables 
 Log of exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log GDP (i) 1.991*** 2.001*** 1.969*** 2.095*** 
 (30.80) (30.34) (30.70) (30.58) 
Log GDP (j) 1.256*** 1.307*** 1.261*** 1.354*** 
 (23.23) (23.40) (23.36) (24.03) 
Log Population (i) -1.676*** -1.549*** -1.597*** -1.592*** 
 (-15.23) (-14.04) (-14.77) (-14.33) 
Log Population (j) 0.671*** 0.798*** 0.671*** 0.745*** 
 (6.593) (7.793) (6.676) (7.225) 
Log reer (i) 0.0451** 0.0361* 0.0522*** 0.0317 
 (2.370) (1.863) (2.732) (1.621) 
Gap ER (i,j) 0.00179 0.00277 0.00102 0.00248 
 (0.253) (0.390) (0.143) (0.351) 
Corruption (i) 0.0565***   0.0727*** 
 (3.588)   (4.329) 
Corruption (j) 0.0368**   0.0410*** 
 (2.452)   (2.584) 
 Law & order (i)  0.0432***  0.0743*** 
  (2.682)  (4.330) 
 Law & order (j)  0.0585***  0.0892*** 
  (3.931)  (5.698) 
Democracy (i)   0.0301** 0.0298** 
   (2.484) (2.382) 
Democracy (j)   0.0666*** 0.0727*** 
   (5.981) (6.322) 
Intercept -61.45*** -66.36*** -62.38*** -68.74*** 
 (-20.56) (-21.20) (-20.87) (-21.82) 
     
Observations 32,063 32,063 32,063 32,063 
R-squared 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 
Bilateral countries 7,141 7,141 7,141 7,141 
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. T statistics in parentheses 
5.3.2 The problem of zero observations 
Recent advances in the economic literature on trade gravity models have shown that 
there may be large part of zero export flows between partner’s countries.  Our previous 
results are based on a truncated sample because 10% of country-pairs do not trade. 
They are dropped from estimates when we use logarithms of export flows. We therefore 
run Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimators (Silva & Tenreyro 2006)  
for which results are reported in column (2) of Table 9. We find that the similarity in 
environmental policies between trading countries again has no effect on bilateral trade 
flows. 
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Table 9: Effect of similarity in environmental policy on  
bilateral trade flows 
 
Dependent variable Log of exports Export 
 (1) (2) 
 FE PPML 
Log GDP (i) 1.550*** 0.765*** 
 (28.21) (13.02) 
Log GDP (j) 1.218*** 0.883*** 
 (25.34) (22.41) 
Log Population (i) -1.568*** -0.0308 
 (-14.79) (-0.511) 
Log Population (j) 0.894*** -0.206*** 
 (9.020) (-5.388) 
Log reer (i) 0.0461** 2.982** 
 (2.322) (2.244) 
Gap ER (i,j) 0.00298 -0.0269 
 (0.472) (-1.328) 
Intercept -54.68*** -39.38*** 
 (-19.69) (-5.599) 
Observations 38,216 42,292 
R-squared 0.813 0.371 
Bilateral countries 8,689  
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. T statistics in parentheses 
 
 
5.3.3 Alternative measure of bilateral trade and environmental policies 
In the baseline model (equation 5), the dependent variable is the bilateral export 
flow. Because our sample is a set of heterogeneous countries, we normalize the bilateral 
export flows and use the ratio bilateral exports to GDP (Vijil & Wagner 2012; Melo & 
Grether 2000).  
In accordance with the modification of the dependent variable, the GDP and 
Population of partner countries are substituted by GDP per capita. Indeed, according to 
the literature, economic size may be captured either by a country´s income (GDP) and 
population or by a country´s income per capita (GDP per capita).  We then consider 
income per capita because the dependent variable (bilateral exports /GDP) is 
mechanically related to income (GDP). Other traditional determinants are similar. Table 
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10 concludes that a similarity in environmental policies has no effect on bilateral 
exports, primary commodity exports and manufactured exports. 
Two alternative measures of environmental policy are also employed.  To make sure 
that our results are robust, environmental policy is computed with additional mixed 
variables: income inequality and the square of income per capita (Environmental 
Kuznets Curve). Whatever the indicator6 (Gap ER (i,j)_A, Gap ER (i,j)_B) used, the results 
(Table 11) are always unchanged. 
  
                                                        
6 To compute Gap ER (i,j)_A  and Gap ER (i,j)_B,  we use columns 2 and 3  of Table 2. We find similar results 
when we use DEEP for Sulphur dioxide emissions (columns 4, 5 and 6 of table 2).  Tables are available for 
requests.  
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Table 10: Effect of similarity in environmental policy on bilateral trade (export to GDP ratio) 
Dependent variable Log of export 
 
Primary 
commodity 
exports (log 
Manufactured 
exports (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Log GDP per capita (i) 0.731*** 1.321*** 0.732*** 0.771*** 1.658*** 
 (13.98) (19.65) (13.90) (2.656) (5.316) 
Log GDP per capita (j) 0.896*** 1.339*** 0.896*** 0.963*** 1.001*** 
 (19.56) (24.07) (19.50) (7.735) (6.593) 
Log bilateral teer (i,j) 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.108*** -0.171 -0.517** 
 (5.620) (5.891) (5.610) (-0.503) (-2.201) 
Gap ER (i,j) 0.00333 -0.0290 0.00548 0.00574 -0.000185 
 (0.524) (-0.673) (0.184) (0.282) (-0.00771) 
Gap ER(i,j)*Log GDP 
per capita (i,j) 
 0.00358    
  (0.700)    
Log GDP per capita(i,j)  -1.654***    
  (-14.23)    
Gap ER(i,j)*Difference 
GDP(log)  per capita (i,j) 
  -0.000256   
 
Gap ER(i,j)*Log GDP 
per capita (i,j) 
  (-0.0739)   
Intercept -36.67*** -31.09*** -36.67*** -6.145** -13.27*** 
 (-67.26) (-45.59) (-66.73) (-2.423) (-5.435) 
Observations 38,216 38,216 38,216 1,777 3,046 
R-squared 0.787 0.788 0.787 0.305 0.177 
Bilateral countries 8,689 8,689 8,689 465 897 
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. T statistics in parentheses 
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Table 11: Similarity in environmental policy and bilateral trade: alternative 
measures of environmental policy 
Dependent variable Log of exports 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log GDP (i) 1.550*** 1.258*** 1.261*** 
 (28.21) (11.82) (11.76) 
Log GDP (j) 1.218*** 1.419*** 1.426*** 
 (25.34) (10.89) (10.91) 
Log Population (i) -1.568*** -1.415*** -1.438*** 
 (-14.79) (-5.208) (-5.274) 
Log Population (j) 0.894*** 1.574*** 1.561*** 
 (9.020) (6.876) (6.817) 
Log bilateral teer (i,j) 0.0461** 0.115 0.117 
 (2.322) (1.305) (1.322) 
Gap ER (i,j)_A  -0.0112  
  (-1.013)  
Gap ER (i,j) 0.00298   
 (0.472)   
Gap ER (i,j)_B   0.00234 
   (0.226) 
Intercept -54.68*** -67.13*** -66.81*** 
 (-19.69) (-9.916) (-9.877) 
Observations 38,216 10,861 10,861 
R-squared 0.813 0.714 0.714 
Bilateral Countries 8,689 3,866 3,866 
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% Number in parentheses are t-value. 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper analyses the effect of a gap in revealed environmental policies between 
trading partners on bilateral trade flows for 122 countries in the period 1980-2010. 
Contrary to previous papers in the economic literature, which use either input-oriented 
indicators or output-oriented indicators, we use an index of environmental policy. 
Labelled domestic efforts for environmental protection (deep), this index does not 
depend on other factors (structural or mixed) in that country’s policy. 
Our results suggest that a gap in environmental policies does not dampen bilateral 
trade flows. Second, we show that the effect (absence) of a gap in environmental policies 
on trade flows is not conditional on the level of development of countries. Third the 
results don’t depend on the characteristics (manufactured goods and primary 
commodity) of exported goods. These results are robust to alternative robustness 
checks.  
Our results are important in terms of recommendations for economic policies. They 
incite developing and developed countries to increase efforts to protect environmental 
quality. These climate and environmental policies will not dampen the competitiveness 
of countries.  
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8 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Correlation between DEEP and environmental measures and 
agreements 
 
 co2_deep   so2_deep 
   
Annex1 
Kyoto 
Protocol 
Environ 
mental 
tax 
 
Energy tax 
co2_deep 1     
so2_deep  0.0942    1     
Annex 1 Kyoto P  -0.4564***    -0.0722 1   
Environment tax -0.5861 ***  -0.8504*** 0.2349    1  
Energy tax -0.2088   -0.0588 0.2831 **   0.0226 1 
 
 
Appendix 2: Variable definitions and sources 
 
Variables  Definitions  Sources  
Export Total value of exports of the 
country i to the country j, 
Millions of US dollars  
 
COMTRADE 
 GDP  (i), GDP (j) Gross domestic product  
of country i or country j,  
current million US dollars  
WDI (2012) 
 Population (i), Population (j) Annual population growth 
rate of country i or country j 
Population is based on the de 
facto definition of population, 
which counts all residents 
regardless of legal status or 
citizenship--except for 
refugees not permanently 
settled in the country of 
asylum, who are generally 
considered part of the 
population of the country of 
origin. 
WDI (2012) 
DEEP  Domestic effort for 
environmental protection.  
Computed by Authors  
 
Gap ER (i,j) Similarity in environmental 
policies (DEEP) between 
trading partners 
Computed by Authors  
 
 GDP per capita, constant 2000 
USD 
 WDI (2012) 
Corruption Indicator of corruption as 
reported by international 
consultants. Scaled from 
ICRG 
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O to 6, higher values denote 
less corruption 
 
Law & order Law and Order are assessed 
separately, with each sub-
component comprising zero 
to three points. The Law sub-
component is an assessment 
of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal 
system, while the Order sub-
component is an assessment 
of popular observance of the 
law. Thus, a country can enjoy 
a high rating – 3 – in terms of 
its judicial system, but a low 
rating – 1 – if it suffers from a 
very high crime rate of if the 
law is routinely ignored 
without effective sanction (for 
example, widespread illegal 
strikes). 
ICRG 
Democracy This is a measure of how 
responsive government is to 
its people, on the basis that 
the less responsive it is, the 
more likely it is that the 
government will fall, 
peacefully in a democratic 
society, but possibly violently 
in a non-democratic one 
ICRG 
Common Language 1 for countries sharing a 
common official language  
 
CEPII 
Distance Geographical distance between 
the largest cities of i and j 
weighted by the proportion of 
the city’s overall country 
population, km  
 
CEPII 
Contiguity 1 for countries sharing a border  
 
CEPII 
Carbon dioxide per capita Carbon dioxide emissions are 
those stemming from the 
burning of fossil fuels and the 
manufacture of cement. They 
include carbon dioxide 
produced during 
consumption of solid, liquid, 
and gas fuels and gas flaring. 
WDI (2012) 
Sulfur dioxide per capita Sulphur dioxide emission per 
GDP  
David Stern (2005) 
Economic growth GDP average annual growth WDI (2012) 
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rate, % 
Trade  Trade is the sum of exports 
and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share 
of gross domestic product. 
WDI (2012) 
Income inequality EHII (Estimated Household 
Income Inequality) variable is 
an index ranging from 0 (no 
inequality) to 1 (perfect 
inequality).   
University of Texas Inequality 
Project (UTIP) database 
(2008) 
 
REER The REER  is a CPI-based real 
effective exchange rate, 
defined as a weighted 
geometric mean of the 
bilateral nominal exchange 
rate and consumer price 
indices. It take into account 
the10 largest trading partners 
over the period 200-2008 
 
 International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) and CERDI 
calculation 
Energy tax Energy tax revenues as 
percentage of total revenues  
EUROSTAT 
Environmental tax Environmental tax  revenues 
as percentage of total 
revenues. 
 
EUROSTAT 
 
 
Appendix 3: Data used to compute the domestic efforts of environmental 
protection (Summary Statistics) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DEEP (co2) 544 -1.039452 2.524249 -10 10 
DEEP (so2) 544 .1045352 1.775024 -10 10 
Residu-co2 544 -.004855 .3857367 -.96909 2.904843 
Residu-so2 544 .0049914 .5175716 -3.12151 2.716986 
co2 per capita 544 4.121948 5.82373 .0149349 55.04334 
so2 per capita 544 .000013 .0000197 1.33e-07 .0001649 
co2 per capita (log)  544 .3067105 1.754491 -4.204056 4.008121 
so2 per capita (log) 544 -12.03178 1.265662 -15.83289 -8.71047 
gdp capita (log)  544 7.515326 1.630679 4.445175 10.77187 
Population growth 544 1.801467 1.261486 -4.644716 6.160783 
Economic growth 544 3.266433 3.962397 -42.45112 33.34696 
Trade (log) 544 4.082641 .5392496 2.555366 5.606332 
REER (log) 544 4.742542 .4878034 3.589216 10.46013 
Income inequality  379 42.07493 6.371779 26.41345 64.2473 
Deep co2 (eq6) 380 -.746186 2.454736 -10 10 
Deep co2 (eq7) 380 -.2367504 2.634788 -10 10 
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Appendix 4: Data used to estimate environmental policies on trade flows 
(Summary Statistics) 
 
Variable   Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Export 42292 122526.9 1920389 0 1.72e+08 
Log of export 38216 3.007629 4.804744 -19.33697 18.96019 
Log GDP  (i) 42292 24.53953 2.201506 19.10038 30.08547 
Log GDP  (j) 42292 23.88649 2.19372 18.72202 30.08547 
Log Population (i) 42292 16.38086 1.540362 11.94303 21.00186 
Log Population (j) 42292 16.2686 1.590785 11.09309 21.00186 
Log bilateral reer 
(i,j) 
42292 4.72921 .5776506 2.971653 14.00383 
DEEP (i) 42292 -1.392026 2.640095 -8.457233 5.679702 
DEEP (j) 42292 -1.039452 2.524249 -10 10 
Gap ER (DEEP) 42292 2.917947 2.263038 .0003948 17.77451 
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Appendix 5:  Data used to compute the domestic efforts of environmental protection (Correlation matrix) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  DEEP 
(co2) 
DEE
P 
(so2) 
co2 
per 
capita 
(log) 
so2 per 
capita 
(log) 
gdp 
capita 
(log) 
Pop 
 
growth 
Economi
c growth 
Trade 
(log) 
REER 
(log) 
DEEP (co2) 1,00                
DEEP (so2) 0,45 1,00              
co2 per capita 
(log) 
0,01 -0,03 1,00            
so2 per capita 
(log) 
0,06 0,10 0,73 1,00          
gdp capita 
(log)  
-0,32 -0,14 0,90 0,61 1,00        
Pop growth 0,21 0,22 -0,49 -0,29 -0,49 1,00      
Economic 
growth 
0,06 0,03 -0,01 -0,04 -0,05 0,20 1,00    
Trade (log) 0,34 0,46 0,29 0,21 0,24 -0,09 0,07 1,00  
REER (log) 0,21 0,41 -0,20 -0,15 -0,26 0,23 -0,05 -0,16 1,00 
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Appendix 6:  Data used to estimate environmental policies on trade flows (Correlation matrix) 
 
 
 Export 
(log) 
Gap ER 
(DEEP) 
Log 
GDP  (i) 
Log 
GDP  (j) 
Log Pop (i) Log Pop 
(j) 
Log bil 
reer (i,j) 
Export (log) 1.0000       
Gap ER (DEEP)  0.1295 1.0000      
Log GDP  (i) 0.5058 0.1891 1.000
0 
    
 Log GDP  (j) 0.4229 0.0860 -
0.1108 
1.0000    
Log Pop (i) 0.3047 0.0655 0.6688 -
0.0701 
1.0000   
Log Pop (j) 0.2506 0.0284 -
0.0759 
0.6781 -0.0484 1.0000  
Log bil reer (i,j) -0.1279 0.0076 -
0.2018 
0.0244 -0.0397 0.0142 1.0000 
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Appendix 7: List of countries 
 
 Origin countries (72)   
Armenia,  Australia, Austria,  Burundi, Belgium,  Burundi, Belgium, Bulgaria, Bahrain, 
Bolivie, Central African Republic, Canada,  Switzerland,  Chile, China, Ivory-Cost, 
Cameroon,  Colombia,  Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Spain, Finland,  Fiji,  France,  Gabon, United 
Kingdom,  Georgia,  Ghana, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea,  Greece, Croatia,  Hungary, 
Ireland, Iran,  Israel, Italy,  Japan, Luxembourg,  Morocco, Mexico, Malawi,  Malaysia,  
Nigeria, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Norway,  New Zealand, Pakistan,  Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Paraguay, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, United States of America,  Venezuela, South Africa, Congo, Dem. Rep. 
and Zambia 
 
Destination countries (128)  
Angola, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Burundi, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bahrain, Belarus, 
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, Central African Republic, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, 
Chine, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo  Rep., Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Djibouti, Denmark, Dominican  Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Arab Rep., Eritrea, Spain, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Fiji, France, Gabon, United Kingdom, 
Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Greece, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Croatia, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Japan, Kenya, Cambodia, Korea  Rep, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Morocco, Madagascar, Mexico, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Norway, Nepal, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Qatar, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Senegal, El Salvador, 
Sweden, Swaziland, Seychelles, Syrian Arab Republic, Chad, Togo, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States, Venezuela,  South Africa, 
Congo, Dem. Rep, Zambia Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
